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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 815 (1993)

INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 23 of my report of 15 May 1993 (S/25777) relating to the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), I expressed the view that it was not advisable for me at that time to recommend that the Security Council adopt one of the three options I had outlined in paragraph 20 of that report. I stated that, before making a recommendation to the Council about the future of UNPROFOR in Croatia, I would prefer to await a report from my Special Representative, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, who was about to visit the area. The present report is now submitted, following advice received from Mr. Stoltenberg, to provide the Council with a recommendation relating to the mandate of UNPROFOR, the renewal of which would, as members of the Council are aware, apply to all the republics of the former Yugoslavia in which UNPROFOR is deployed. Ongoing activities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina appear to warrant an extension of the Force's mandate in those countries; the present report therefore focuses primarily on UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia.

I. FUTURE OF UNPROFOR

2. As I stated in my report of 10 February 1993 (S/25264), a sound basis will not exist for renewing UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia unless two factors are addressed: the failure by the parties, and in particular the Serb side, to permit implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan; and the failure of both parties to cooperate in establishing a political process that would offer the prospect of an early agreed settlement to the conflict between them. Although intensive efforts have been made by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and by UNPROFOR, no significant progress has occurred in either case.

3. At the same time, it is clear that the presence of UNPROFOR is indispensable to control of the conflict, which continues to simmer, and sometimes boil over, in Croatia and to the fostering of a climate in which negotiations between the parties can be promoted. The role of UNPROFOR in present circumstances is thus to prevent the resumption or escalation of conflict; to provide a breathing-space for the continued efforts of the

peacemakers; and to support the provision of essential humanitarian assistance to the victims of the ongoing conflict. Without prejudice to its basic mandate of implementing the agreed peace-keeping plan, UNPROFOR's continued presence can be justified at least by these functions. The termination of its mandate would, in the judgement of the Co-Chairmen, risk the resumption of a major conflict in the region and cause severe adverse consequences for humanitarian relief operations.

4. It should also be noted that the presence of UNPROFOR in Croatia does not only fulfil a role in respect of the United Nations protected areas (UNPAs). In Sector East and in Dalmatia, the UNPROFOR presence plays an important deterrent and mediating role between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In other areas of Croatia, UNPROFOR's presence provides an operational link to contiguous areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, UNPROFOR's logistics bases at Zagreb and Split are indispensable to its ability to support its operations inside Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. In view of the above considerations, I have, for the moment, rejected the option of withdrawing the Force from Croatia (S/25777, para. 20 (a)). The option of enforcement action remains impracticable for the reasons set out in my earlier report (S/25777, para. 20 (b)). This leaves me with no option other than that of leaving UNPROFOR in place, with its existing mandate, and doing so in the hope that a changing international environment will facilitate and bring to fruition intensified peacemaking efforts by the Co-Chairmen, with the support of UNPROFOR.

6. I am conscious that the exercise of this option would fall short of the wish expressed by the Government of Croatia that the renewal of the mandate should take place only in conditions that equip the Force to enforce its mandate against the Serb side in accordance with a specific timetable. Since I do not consider the targets proposed by the Croatian authorities to be realizable in the short run without the active cooperation of the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs and pink zones, I have asked my Special Representative to seek the consent of the Government of Croatia to a limited further extension of UNPROFOR's mandate by three months. If this consent is not granted, I shall report the matter to the Security Council for appropriate decision.

7. In this connection, I should like to stress that UNPROFOR has been performing a difficult task with courage and determination amidst seriously deteriorating conditions, both in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR soldiers have increasingly been targeted by all sides, and severe restrictions are placed upon their freedom of movement. UNPROFOR has incurred over 500 casualties, including 46 fatalities, in the 14 months of its deployment, of which 246 and 25, respectively, have occurred in Croatia. Attacks upon humanitarian convoys have become more frequent and indiscriminate, threatening the courageous efforts of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organizations. Should the threats to the safety and security of United Nations personnel, which have already reached unacceptable levels, mount further, I would have to inform the Council that a viable basis for their functioning no longer existed.

8. I should also like to recall that UNPROFOR's deployment embodies the will of the international community to help the parties to arrive at an overall

settlement of their conflict. In turn, it is the responsibility of the parties to demonstrate by their conduct that they are seriously committed to pursuing the path of peace. Should it become apparent that this is not the case, I do not believe it would be a worthwhile use of the limited resources of the United Nations to maintain a peace-keeping operation where it had become clear that there was no peace to keep.

II. OBSERVATIONS

9. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNPROFOR by a further three months, to 30 September 1993. Significant progress will be required in the peacemaking efforts of the Co-Chairmen if any further renewal is to be contemplated beyond that date.

10. In recommending this extension, it is my duty to call once again upon Member States to honour their financial obligations to UNPROFOR. Reimbursements to troop-contributing States remain several months behind schedule, a problem that has been cited by several of them in declining invitations to participate in other United Nations peace-keeping operations or even to maintain and enlarge their contingents in UNPROFOR. I do not believe it would be responsible of me to recommend further extensions of UNPROFOR if the material resources required for its effective functioning are not forthcoming from Member States.